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In David Cronenberg’s eXistenZ (1999), video-game designer Allegra Geller 
(Jennifer Jason Leigh) and the security agent assigned her by the game 
company, Ted Pikul (Jude Law), are on the lam after an assassination attempt 
on Geller. Geller needs to play her game to make sure that its software has 
survived the attack and is dismayed to find that Pikul has not been fitted 
with a “bio-port,” the spinal-jack required to plug the game directly into 
one’s nervous system. Pikul somewhat ashamed admits to a “phobia about 
getting (his) body penetrated…surgically,” but agrees to the procedure. After 
a harrowing black-market insertion of  the port, Geller fingers Pikul’s port in 
anticipation of  play, commenting that new ones are often a bit tight. Pikul, a 
nervous techno-virgin, asks “how come bio-ports don’t get infected? I mean 
they open right into your body.” “Listen to what you are saying,” says Geller, 
“Don’t be ludicrous.” And she provocatively opens her mouth to recall to 
Pikul that there are many quite natural ways that our bodies are open to the 
world and to others.
I open this article with a scene from eXistenZ because it captures well 
both the anxiety and the exhilaration that new media still elicits in the social 
imagination. As he did in his earlier film Videodrome (1983), Cronenberg 
quite literally depicts new media’s penetration of  bodies and blurring of  
realities and identities. The characters Pikul and Geller represent two, almost 
archetypal, responses to new media. Pikul’s “phobia,” his fear of  being 
penetrated by media (and by Geller), foregrounds a tacit sense that the 
subject is impermeable; a feeling that defines the subject/object distinction 
and the everyday sense of  reality that it underwrites. To a great degree such a 
view is ordinary and functional, but Geller is right that beyond the ordinary 
and functional such a view is “ludicrous.” As a proposition about biology, 
ecology, psychology, or aesthetic or erotic experience, a claim of  human 
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impermeability is meaningless. We are in many and complex ways permeated 
by the world and others—and also by media. Geller unlike the anxious Pikul, 
welcomes all neural-input without distinction and, indeed, prefers to “jack-
in” to her game, even at the risk of  her own life. Apparently beyond petty 
investment in bodily and ontological boundaries, Geller embraces the game 
as her central reality. Geller is the game’s designer, however, and her sense 
of  its significance is bound up with her own narcissism. She is a recluse, 
disdainful of  the world, who typically wields her immense power away from 
real-world social interaction. 
My working assumption in this article is that new media, particularly in 
the form of  interactive gaming, have aroused the responses they have-—
responses I am associating with Pikul and Geller, anxiety and exhilaration 
respectively—because they have contributed to the cultural visibility of  
affect and enabled the emergence of  a permeable model of  the self, a self  
inextricably bound with others and the world. New media have contributed in 
the fashion by subverting the tacit presumption of  impermeability, especially 
in its most patriarchal forms.1 Affect is the marker of  our permeability. Affect 
is the trace left by our intercourse with the world and with others; it is the 
tissue through which the unconscious bleeds into consciousness; it is the 
material strata of  thought, the unthought within thought itself. 
My claim is not, however, that new media as a matter of  course can 
condition a new self  more aware of  the role affect plays in its connection 
to the world and others. Indeed, I argue that the positions represented by 
Pikul and Geller both work against an understanding of  our permeability. 
There are powerful incentives to retreat to or recuperate a sense of  bounded 
impermeability. Indeed as new media call attention to affect, they risk 
unleashing even more extreme forms of  bounded subjectivity in reaction. 
Cronenberg recognizes the stakes: not only is Pikul “phobic,” he is a terrorist 
bent on destroying Geller and her game in the name of  reality. Excesses of  
bounded subjectivity lead to violence, to war and to extermination.2 My claim, 
rather, is more tentative, but still hopeful. We life in an era where the strong 
form of  bounded subjectivity, the Cartesian subjectivity we inherited from the 
Enlightenment, has been thoroughly undermined by critical theory, biology 
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and psychology, though it persists in many institutionalized forms. We are 
more aware of  our permeability and have more opportunities to explore such 
in ways which could alter our relations with others and the world in positive 
ways. New media, under the right conditions, can be a laboratory for such 
explorations and play, the means. In what follows I consider the two positions 
on new media gaming I am associating with Pikul and Geller, positions 
that wholly reject or embrace new media’s penetration respectively; I, then, 
consider an instance of  a game that opens rather than closes possibilities for 
the subject and gives us a sense of  new media’s potential.
The Perils of  Pikul: Half-Life of  the Modern Subject
I begin my discussion by considering an exhibit which works with video 
gaming as an artistic medium to stage the effects of  gaming on its mostly 
young male fans. The work positions itself  at the hinge between old and new 
media, between critical distance and immersion, and hence offers a perfect 
way into the issues this article seeks to address. 
Marco Brambilla’s Half-Life from the New Museum of  Contemporary 
Art’s media lounge (October 2-December 7, 2003) is an implicit indictment 
of  video game culture that shows the persistence of  Pikul’s form of  bounded 
subjectivity despite, indeed, in reaction to, the proliferation of  so-called 
immersive technologies.3 The main feature of  Brambilla’s installation is a 
gallery with large LCD screens on each of  its four walls. On three walls 
recorded projections of  the block-buster first person “shooter” (fps) video 
game Counter-Strike show terrorists and counter-terrorists battling in a 
vaguely middle-eastern fortress. The soundtrack is amplified to fill the room 
and evokes gun-fire and exploding bodies. The screen on the fourth wall is 
subdivided into smaller screens, each showing a player of  the game as he 
plays in a cyber-café in suburban Garden Grove, Orange County, CA. The 
camera is mounted on the monitor to capture the player/apparatus interface. 
The faces are nearly indistinguishable from one another. The players are all 
adolescent boys, devoid of  affect, undertaking their task with apparent grim 
determination. 
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The gallery visitor feels assaulted by the jarring noise and images in the 
gallery and then somewhat unnerved by the zombie-like look of  the game 
players. The most significant feature of  the installation, however, is not the 
immediate content of  its own screens, but is the opposition it stages between 
the gallery audience, the installation’s own use of  media, and the game players 
in the interactive new media environment. While the installation takes new 
media as its object and gives an impression of  immersion in the game space 
by surrounding the visitor with nearly life-size game scenes, it does not, and 
cannot, invite the visitor into the game space in the way that the game does its 
players. What we see is a recorded and looped projection of  a game sequence, 
not the game as it is actually played. The gallery visitor, hence, is positioned 
as external to the action depicted; she is detached from the game space and 
clearly meant to regard it as a critical outsider. And from this position, I 
would argue, it is difficult not to condemn the object of  the installation and to 
be deeply suspicious of  the media that make it possible. 
As gallery visitors we know that the boys whose faces we see on the 
screen are not just witnessing gory militarized violence (as we are), but are 
participating in it. Their affect-less faces suggest a level of  fusion with their 
soldier-avatars that takes what is theorized as identification in film theory 
to a new level of  participatory engagement. The game, as it appears in the 
installation, largely dispenses with context and seems to offer little more than 
the excitement of  targeting and killing the enemy while avoiding being killed 
oneself. Counter-Strike as shown to us in Half-Life presumes a simple world 
of  us and them, kill or be killed, a world of  intensity and instantaneity that 
doesn’t abide questions and allows little time for recognition, reflection and 
conscious decision. The imputed experience of  immersion and the game’s 
interactivity seem like vehicles for the loss of  identity and autonomy and a 
terrible reduction of  the complex real world to a virtual world of  mindless 
violence. The installation’s title Half-Life is both a knowing reference to the 
game from which Counter-Strike derives and a critical commentary on the 
young players’ experience and, by extension, on the society increasingly 
saturated with such media. 
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The installation echoes, in visual terms, the focus familiar from 
postmodernism on a distinction between distance and immersion as defining 
characteristics of  modernity and post-modernity respectively. For such diverse 
critics as Fredric Jameson and Jean Baudrillard, postmodernism breaks down 
the distance between self  and other and between self  and world and in so 
doing irreparably endangers the critical subject. For Jameson the effect of  
the breakdown of  key cultural boundaries is the loss of  culture’s ability to 
be “critical, negative, contestatory, subversive, oppositional and the like” 
(Jameson 125). Instead, the new cultural dominant produces an intensification 
of  the present time and the experience of  material reality often associated 
with schizophrenia (Jameson 118-119). For Baudrillard the possibility of  
alienation, the experience of  distance, has disappeared. What is left is the 
“obscene,” a “too great proximity of  everything, the unclean promiscuity of  
everything which touches, invests and penetrates without resistance” (132). 
“The schizo,” Baudrillard says, “can no longer produce the limits of  his own 
being, can no longer play nor stage himself, can no longer produce himself  as 
mirror. He is now only a pure screen, a switching center for all the networks 
of  influence” (133). According to such an account the game player of  Half-
Life appears to be an apotheosis of  postmodernism. He seems immersed in 
an “obscene” world of  experience from which he can gain no distance. The 
game player before his monitor becomes “pure screen,” a mere conduit for 
the game, which, it may be more accurate to say, is playing him.
The fear of  immersion evident in postmodern theory resonates with 
Pikul’s fear of  penetration. And the two taken together establish a range of  
worries from the psycho-sexual to the ontological that the visibility of  our 
permeability unleashes. The interlocking sets of  dualisms produced here-—
distance/immersion, critical/influenced, bounded/penetrated—suggest a 
dilemma: either a detached, critical, bounded subjectivity and a clear sense of  
reality or an immersed, influenced, penetrated self  lost in a schizo flux. One is 
tempted to respond to this dilemma like Geller: to answer only with derision 
and an obscene gesture. This configuration has never been less convincing and 
indeed the disappearance of  postmodernism from the theoretical landscape 
has much to do with the emergence of  affect and emotion as subjects of  
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critical inquiry and the overcoming of  an identification of  critical subjectivity 
with the bounded Cartesian subject. Jameson and Baudrillard’s modern 
subject, along with Bambrilla’s gallery visitor, implicitly directed to condemn 
the immersed game-player, seem as anachronistic as Cronenberg’s Pikul in 
eXistenZ: reactionary, fearful, paranoid, less a critical, contestatory subject of  
radical modernity than a descendent of  the Descartes who peers from his 
window wondering if  the men on the street below are automatons. We do 
not cease to be critical subjects when we acknowledge the inescapability of  
our permeability; indeed an understanding of  affect is necessary for such. 
Eve Sedgwick in her insightful “Paranoid Reading and Reparative 
Reading, or You’re So Paranoid You Probably Think This Essay Is About 
You,” is explicit about the paranoid quality of  critical theory. Even Freud, she 
notes, pointed out a “striking similarity” between his paranoid patient, Dr. 
Schreber, and his own work (125). And toward the end of  the 20th century 
paranoia had become “a uniquely sanctioned methodology” (126). Sedgwick, 
drawing upon the work of  Melanie Klein, uses the term paranoid to define 
a position—“the characteristic posture that the ego takes up with respect to 
its objects”—not a description of  ontological reality or the structure of  the 
subject per se (128). And as such she underscores that other relations to the 
object are possible, including one which allows for the “repair” of  what is 
severed from the self  “into something like a whole” (128). In the paranoid 
position the ego is deeply invested in its boundaries as an empowering 
developmental achievement and as a position vis-à-vis the world and others. 
But it is not the only position that the subject may take in relation to its 
objects.
 That critical theory most often comes from the paranoid position, as 
Sedgwick argues, makes good sense. Critical theory has attempted not only 
to understand social reality, but also to identify and resist the sexism, racism, 
homophobia, and imperialism endemic to it: “the paranoid position—
understandably marked by hatred, envy, and anxiety—is a position of  
terrible alertness to the dangers posed by the hateful and envious part-
objects that one defensively projects into, carves out of, and ingests from 
the world around one” (Sedgwick 128). Postmodern theory’s distinction 
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between distance and immersion fits easily into this framework, and can be 
seen, in essence, as a defense of  the paranoid position from the position 
of  the paranoid. The postmodern theorists’ fear of  immersion, upon this 
view, comes from the projected content of  the “contamination” of  the 
self  by the world. The schizo subject of  postmodern theory is the negative 
validation of  the paranoid subject, the “too great proximity of  everything,” 
a confirmation of  the persistence of  alienation. The modern subject and 
the postmodern “schizo,” form the zero-sum construction of  an anxious 
mutually affirming self  and other, not two historically contiguous forms as 
Jameson and Baudrillard suggest.
Half-Life gets its moralistic punch from the sense of  distance from the 
game player that it gives the gallery visitor. For the player the illusion of  
distance is quite literally overcome. The game-player is actively engaged; 
the pose of  detached observation is not an option. As the subject loses its 
sense of  distance, its “objectivity,” the clarity of  the reality supported by a 
subject/object distinction is also lost. The sense that the real is “out here” 
in the gallery, not “in” the game becomes questionable. And this is not 
because the game replaces reality for the players, but because we come to 
understand that the gallery presents us with just another game with its own 
set of  rules. The bounded subject that depends upon the dubious claim that 
“just looking” preserves the viewer’s boundaries is deeply destabilized by the 
visible breakdown of  that illusion of  distance. 
Once we begin to analyze the basis for the anxiety about new media, it 
breaks down. The special concerns about new media seem to depend upon a 
claim about analogue media that cannot plausibly be maintained: that media 
such as film, photography and printare less likely to “immerse” the subject 
in a fictional world or to influence its view of  reality. Indeed, when such 
differences between new and now traditional media are dismissed, then 
the “immersed” subject of  new media begins to seem like the real agent 
enabled to redefine reality through his actions. The bounded subject, who 
is “just looking,” from the outside in, appears to be the one who has given 
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up its agency. And once this perspective begins to seem plausible, we are in 
a position to understand the view I’m associating with Allegra Geller: a view 
that embraces permeability, immersion and virtual reality.
Geller, Game Designer and the Boundless Subject
The most obvious criticism of  Bambrilla’s installation is that its design 
does not allow for the representation of  new media in their own terms. The 
stark dualism between traditional and new media that Bambrilla’s installation 
creates depends upon seeing new media from a safe distance. The non-
interactive screens of  the installation cannot reproduce the specificity of  the 
game’s media, its interactivity, and hence it is unable to capture the complexity 
of  the game. Indeed, there is significant evidence of  an active subject at work 
in the playing of  Counter-Strike. The text accompanying Half-Life informs us 
that players play against each other as either terrorists or counter-terrorists and 
the killing depicted on the installation screens underscores this, but this too 
fails to capture the complexity of  the game in which players work together in 
teams and are involved in a variety of  activities: they can buy weapons, rescue 
hostages, plant or defuse bombs, switch identities mid-game, vary tactics 
and strategize cooperation and competition, and communicate through an 
in-game chat system or pre-scripted keyboard codes. Indeed, Counter-Strike 
especially in the period after 9/11 and the invasion of  Iraq, has become 
a locus for political debate and resistance to militarism. Initiatives like that 
of  the Velvet Strike make available spray-on logos that can be applied in the 
game scene as anti-war graffiti and run an on-line site where the tactics for 
subverting the game’s militarist presumptions are shared.
Talmadge Wright and his co-authors in their study of  creative player 
actions in FPS online video games focus upon “creative game talk” as a 
“platform for showing off  human performance” in Counter-Strike.  For Wright, 
the meaning of  playing Counter-Strike is not reducible to the graphics or the 
violent game play, but must be understood through the immense creativity 
and complexity of  interaction that the game makes possible. Playing such 
games, argues Wright, “can both reproduce and challenge everyday rules of  
social interaction while also generating interesting and creative innovations 
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in verbal dialogue and non-verbal expressions” (1). Wright devotes his study 
to mapping the communicative exchanges of  players and analyzing them as 
creative interactions, filled with good humor and cultural awareness. Wright’s 
work changes the impression one has of  the game after seeing Half-Life, 
which derives much of  its force from showing silent, seemingly socially-
isolated young men, staring toward screens. For Wright these men are not 
drones, but highly active, interactive, improvisational and creative subjects.
Because he gives such a compelling defense of  gaming as a practice, 
Wright encourages a more refined critique of  Counter-Strike than Bambrilla 
does. Clearly to reduce the game to its violence would be a mistake and yet, 
its violence forms the horizon of  all the game’s other activities and remains, 
for me, the most fundamental and most disturbing aspect of  Counter-Strike. 
Indeed, the militarized violence and killing is all the more disturbing once 
such is seen in relation to the considerable improvisation and creativity that 
the game involves. It is not new media or immersion per se that is at issue here, 
but the way in which the game is invested in an entrenchment of  the paranoid 
position. War games are a veritable carnival of  projection and boundary 
elaboration; while there is cooperation in CounterStrike, it is undertaken upon 
the presumption of  the boundary between us and them (the enemy) and all 
of  the game’s strategy reinforces this boundary. The premise for such games 
is always thin. Political analysis is not the point. Rather, the game is a grand 
machine for the endless reiteration of  bounded subjectivity. Pace Jameson 
and Baudrillard, it is not the difference of  the “immersed” subject of  new 
media from the detached modern subject that needs to be accounted for, but 
their similarity, the shared hyper-attention to boundaries and the repression 
of  affect. 
Should we doubt the role of  interactive technologies in the production of  
the subjectivity required for war, we only need to note that Wright’s account 
of  the game player sounds very close to the new highly-skilled high-tech 
soldier that one can find described on many of  DARPA’s (Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency) webpages. The military uses interactive games 
to train soldiers and many new technologies depend upon the visual skills 
that complex computer graphics give to game players. At issue is not the 
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conditioning of  a schizo-soldier into confusing virtual reality for the real 
world, but rather training for rapid interpretation of  complex visual data and 
its implementation within a practical context. One DARPA project called 
MANTIS (Multispectral Adaptive Networked Tactical Imaging System) 
“will provide small units with network-enabled collaborative visualization 
for soldier-to-soldier image sharing, access to remote sensors and targeting 
handoff  to off-board weapons, allowing soldiers to point, click and kill” 
(DARPA). MANTIS not only proposes three overlapping systems of  night-
vision, but uses inset displays of  surveillance data shared by other soldiers or 
off-sight detectors. I have to wonder if  this complex system would produce 
confusion in the heat of  battle, but if  it did work it would be an achievement 
of  the training that the players of  Counter-Strike have already begun: 
sophisticated interactive visual digital training and its clear unexamined goal. 
Rather than producing the confusion of  self, other, and world, these games 
produce sophisticated, though instrumentalized, systems of  detection of  
minute elements of  such distinctions. 
That this training is built upon a foundation of  repression and projection 
is evident in MANTIS’ motto, “once again own the night,” which evokes 
primordial fear of  the dark and a sense of  justified seizure to take back the 
means to overcome that fear. The enemy it seems is the repository of  all our 
fear and defeating it will return us to a position of  fearless dominance.
o o o
The apparent inverse of  the fearful position that new media will 
precipitate a collapse of  distance and threaten our sense of  reality is the 
position that views new media as the means to the overcoming of  the illusion 
of  distance and its false sense of  reality. This is the Allegra Geller position; it 
eschews the fear of  new media as “ludicrous” and views it rather as a means 
to overcome the passivity associated with traditional spectatorship, as a means 
to realize oneself  as a cultural agent, rather than as an ideological subject. 
Peter Weibel is perhaps the best advocate of  such a view. The influential 
director of  the Center for Art and Media in Karlsruhe, Germany, filmmaker 
and new media artist sees the new technologies as finally catching up to what 
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advanced twentieth century physics and philosophy have long known about 
the subject’s position vis-a-vis the world—that it is always already on the 
inside, that distance is always an illusion:
 
 In the real world, the observer is always part of  the world he observes,
always an internal observer. The external observer exists only in an
idealized, non-existent world…classical cinema imitates this idealized
world (of  philosophy, mathematics, and classical physics). With their
internal observers, Virtual Reality systems therefore simulate an aspect 
of  reality, bringing interactive images one step closer to the imitation 
of  life (“Intelligent Image” 595).
So, rather than subverting the subject’s critical distance, new media presents 
the subject with a more accurate working model of  the real. 
Weibel believes that the new technologies not only free the observer 
from the snares of  ideology, the “idealized, non-existent world” that seems 
to precede the subject, but from the constraints of  nature as well. They 
encourage us to see ourselves as involved in the shaping of  the real and 
provide the means for its radical redefinition. Weibel speculates that new 
technologies break down the difference between real space and image space 
and “will be a next step toward liberating humanity from the natural prison 
of  space and time” (601). 
A view such as Weibel’s that sets up a distinction between the passive 
subject of  ideology and the active agent of  new media turns the tables on the 
reading of  Counter-Strike that Brambilla’s installation elicits from its audience. 
Weibal’s position would suggest that the installation does not offer critical 
distance from its subject, but rather interpellates the subject through the 
illusion of  distance into accepting the installation’s implicit claim about the 
difference between new and traditional media. While the installation appears 
to respect the subject’s critical capacity, offering a detached view of  the 
video-game, it is every bit as seductive as it suggests Counter-Strike is. The 
positioning of  the viewer as external to the installation’s object reinforces an 
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illusion about the subject that he is outside of  the world he is observing, and 
flatters the viewer for “getting” the critique of  the game that the installation 
itself  produces. 
Half-Life, as its title suggests, depends upon identifying the activity 
of  the game player as something less than “real life.” And this dovetails 
the Baudrillardian claim that we have lost the real, that ours is a world of  
simulation. For Weibel, however, at least potentially, new media collapses the 
difference between the virtual and the real, not by subverting the real, but by 
giving us new powers for its construction. New media realizes the potential 
of  the avant-garde for Weibel: it gives each of  us the power to define and 
construct the real as such.
Such a position seems ripe for a charge of  hubris though and it is such that 
Slavoj Žižek has in mind when he says of  current “technological fantasies,”
What looms at the horizon of  the “digital revolution” is nothing else 
than the prospect that human beings will acquire the capacity of  
what Kant and other German Idealists called “intellectual intuition/
intellektuelle Anschauung/.” The closure of  the gap that separates 
(passive) intuition and (active) production, i.e. the intuition which
immediately generates the object it perceives—the capacity hitherto
reserved for the infinite divine mind. 
The optimism and enthusiasm of  Weibel’s view indeed suggest just such a 
surpassing of  all resistence to human intention and will: the creator finally 
become Creator, the grandest ambition of  the subject per se. 
Weibel’s view appears to be the direct inverse of  the view that is anxious 
about new media immersion; he is exhilarated by its prospects As is often 
the case with apparent oppositions, however, the one between detractors and 
celebrants of  new media hides many shared presumptions. Weibel’s view does 
not allow for a view of  the permeable self  as much as it asserts the self  writ 
large. Both positions are invested in a view of  the subject that emphasizes its 
power to define its own position in the world—either through negation and 
differentiation, in the case of  postmodernism or through creative production 
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of  its own conditions, in the case of  Weibel. And indeed, these are two critical 
dimensions of  modern subjectivity: the ability to resist reality as a critical 
subject and the ability to produce reality as a free agent. Both the bounded 
modern subject and Weibel’s boundless subject represent the subject as free 
only when free of  indiscriminate influence from outside its boundaries. The 
difference between the positions turns more on their respective view of  the 
subject’s terrain of  action than on their view of  subject itself: Baudrillard 
frightens us with the image of  the subject’s “penetration without resistance” 
by new media; Weibel, on the other hand, suggests that new media offers 
us greater opportunities to overcome the resistance of  material reality to 
our “penetration.” In both cases, the subject’s impermeable boundaries are 
presumed and threatened or aggrandized.4 In neither case is the permeable 
self  intertwined with others and the world acknowledged or explored.
We can understand Geller’s lascivious gesture toward Pikul a bit better 
at this point. While Geller seems to challenge the dominant patriarchal order 
when she calls attention to Pikul’s permeability and in her very capacity as 
game designer, what she more accurately represents is a warrior in some sort 
of  battle of  the sexes, wherein she does not effectively overturn the structure 
of  patriarchy as much as she seizes its phallus for herself. From now on 
Geller creates reality; she has the means to penetrate the populace according 
to her own design. It is no surprise then that the film itself  is structured 
around acts of  terrorism representing moves in a war of  position.
I’ve set out two general positions on new media, which I’ve associated 
with Cronenberg’s Pikul and Geller respectively. Both these positions are 
responses to new media’s ability to make visible human permeability. The 
positions appear to be opposed to one another: one suspicious of  new 
media the other fully embracing its immersion. The positions are not actually 
opposed to one another, I maintained, because they both aggrandize the 
bounded subject. Pikul represents the rear-garde attempt to retain a sense 
of  impermeability by attempting to remain free of  new media’s penetration. 
Geller on the other hand seizes the opportunity that new media seems to 
offer for the aggrandizement of  a virtually boundless self. Throughout, the 
stubborn reiteration of  the paranoid position is in evidence. In the next 
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section I want to consider an alternative to both these positions which takes 
the visibility that new media gives to affect and human permeability as an 
opportunity to explore human permeability. 
Playing with the Permeable Self
 The foregoing discussion makes clear that the bounded subject is persistent 
and its virtual counterpart, the boundless subject, does not represent much 
improvement with respect to understanding our permeability. Nevertheless, 
I think that new media has the potential to support the exploration of  new 
models of  subjectivity less focused upon the subject’s boundaries and its self-
assertion and more attuned to the lower registers of  its experience—affect, 
sensory intelligence, and everything which flows between us and one another 
and the world—everything that goes unnoticed by the bounded subject. I am 
not talking here about the postmodern “schizo,” insufficiently bounded to 
sustain subjectivity, but a subject, an “I,” that while still retaining subjective 
integrity recognizes and attends to the permeability of  its boundaries. This 
is a subject that exposes the false dichotomy created by Pikul and Geller; a 
subject that is both bounded and permeable, both itself  and inescapably and 
inextricably interconnected to others and the world. 
Of  critical importance here is a rich notion of  play. Play, for the neo-
Kleinian, D. W. Winnicott, “involves the opportunity to affectively integrate 
experience as one does in dreams, poetry, art, the theater and religion” by 
creating a transitional space wherein the boundaries between self  and other 
and self  and world are softened (Newirth 153). Play, so understood, constitutes 
a break from the concrete subject/object thinking of  the paranoid position. 
It is, importantly, essentially non-purposive; it is open-textured exploratory 
and “facilitat(es) the development of  a (players) capacity to integrate 
disowned aggression and the capacity for symbolic thought” (Newirth 153). 
This notion of  play is very different from the one allowed within a game 
like CounterStrike regardless of  the creativity and improvisation it involves, 
because CounterStrike is organized around a rigid concept, war, and a rigid 
goal, winning. While CounterStrike is not a good model of  play in Winnicott’s 
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sense, its interactive technologies facilitate the softening of  boundaries. In a 
context free from the “prime directive” of  war, such technologies provide 
immense potential for exploration and integration of  affect.
o o o
To see how new media might support an exploration of  our permeable 
selves through affective play, I want to consider another new media 
installation, AlphaWolf, (FCMM Montreal, Quebec, October 9-19, 2003), 
produced by the MIT Media Lab Synthetic Characters Group. AlphaWolf  
produces neither the illusion of  critical distance of  Brambilla’s installation, 
nor the impoverished social script of  Counter-Strike. It avoids the excesses 
of  the bounded subject and, more remarkably, it seems carefully designed to 
avoid the grandiosity of  the boundless subject of  virtual reality. AlphaWolf is 
interactive, immersive, encouraging participants to play directly with affect, 
but in so doing it opens a transitional space that unleashes aggression and 
encourages reflexive understanding of  affect, interactivity, and immersion in 
the complex and creative formation of  self  in community with others. 
AlphaWolf, according to its designer’s description,
features a pack of  directable three-dimensional animated wolves. Three
participants direct the actions of  three pups in a newborn litter. By
howling, growling, whining or barking into microphones, participants
tell their pups to howl, growl, whine or bark. In addition, by clicking with
a mouse in the virtual world, participants can tell their pups where to go
and with whom to interact. An interaction session with the wolves lasts 
approximately five minutes. During this time, the pups wake up and meet
their pack mates. There are six wolves in all—three user-directed pups,
and three fully autonomous adults. The individual wolves autonomously
form and remember social relationships with each other based on their
interactions with other wolves. In turn these relationships color the way 
in which the pups perform the actions that they are directed to take 
(Tomlinson 2).
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While AlphaWolf is a game, it is not a traditional game. The goal is to 
explore the social world of  the wolf, not to win a battle or finish a task. Many 
people have deep interest in animals, however, so the game is still potentially 
quite compelling to a popular audience. 
The relationship between the participant and his or her wolf, is an 
especially significant feature of  AlphaWolf. Again, from the designer:
In AlphaWolf, each human participant has high-level control over the 
action of  a virtual wolf, but the wolf ’s emotional state is auto-
nomously determined by a computer. This distinction between action 
and emotion makes it possible for participants to direct the actions of  
the virtual wolves without compromising the wolves’ realistic behavior…
the autonomously determined emotional states cause the wolves to 
behave like real wolves throughout the course of  the installation 
(Tomlinson 1). 
AlphaWolf does not position the participant outside the action as in 
Brambilla’s Half-Life, nor does it position him or her inside, in the sense of  
creating fusion with the game action as encouraged in Counter-Strike. Several 
features of AlphaWolf  work against fusion: the non-realism of  the graphics, 
the awkwardness of  the vocalizations, the otherness of  a distinct species, and 
most importantly the fact that the characters are semi-autonomous: they are 
directed by the participant, but maintain their realistic wolf  identities. We do 
not “become wolf ” in AlphaWolf, even less does the wolf  “become human,” 
but we play between human and wolf  identity, experiencing moments of  
harmony and dissonance, learning something, nevertheless, about each 
respective identity along the way. This feature allows the game to push 
back against the subject undermining its inflation to boundless grandiosity. 
Rather than leading the player to imagine that she may overcome the “natural 
prison of  space and time” as Weibel believes, it reminds the player that the 
materiality of  nature sets a limit to our fantasy (“The Intelligent Image” 601). 
The use of  wolf  vocalizations to begin the program and shape character 
behavior produces an instant affective investment in the environment. We 
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understand the sounds to be simultaneously communicative and affective. 
Each of  the sounds, the whimper, growl, bark, and howl, elicits behavior that 
shapes relations among characters in the moment and in future interactions. 
As participants in AlphaWolf  then, we are forced to communicate and interact 
without conceptual language. This feature foregrounds the affective charge 
within communicative exchanges and its effect upon social interactions. The 
affective dimension of  language figures into human interaction, as well as 
wolf  interaction, but often works beneath the register of  conscious attention 
for human language speakers. AlphaWolf explores this dimension by drawing 
participants into its explicit performance. Granted, players of  AlphaWolf  may 
not think of  their experience in the terms I am presently using to describe it, 
but their performance within the game is itself  an exercise in the exploration 
and recognition of  the role of  affect in social interaction. It was evident in 
the gallery where I saw AlphaWolf that the play had an effect on the mood 
of  the participants and may well have reconfigured to some degree their 
communicative interactions. Players were tentative at first, but the ability 
to take on the wolf  persona allowed a range of  affective performance and 
interaction and play rare in the art gallery.
Half-Life and Counter-Strike both produce an effect of  separation between 
“us and them.” Half-Life leads its viewers to believe that the players of  Counter-
Strike have been dehumanized through their interaction with new media, 
thus creating a separation between we knowing, still human, art consumers 
and the “post-human,” video game drone. Counter-Strike is predicated upon 
there being an enemy that we must destroy or be destroyed by. AlphaWolf, on 
the other hand, locates us in a social field of  others with whom we interact 
and build complex relational histories. This dimension of  AlphaWolf seems 
particularly realistic to the participant and may draw us into recognition that 
we are always already embedded in a community of  others, that many of  
our actions are undertaken only half  consciously and that we only come 
to understand ourselves and our behavior slowly and within the context 
of  interaction. This recognition is encouraged not only by the program 
which simulates wolf  society and allows us to participate in such, but also 
by producing an interactive social experience for its human participants in 
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the gallery space. Real life and virtual reality are in complex relation, not 
reduced to the same as in Baudrillard or Weibel, as the participant undertakes 
to discover, learn, create, and interact with the other human participants in 
AlphaWolf. 
While AlphaWolf does not produce separation or alienation, it does 
open a space for reflexive understanding. It does so particularly well, I think, 
because it allows us to play at being animals. Ours is a culture long obsessed 
with distinguishing ourselves from other animals. This obsession has left 
a legacy of  blindness to what we share with them, affect, embodiment, 
the givenness of  community and led us to over-estimate the social and 
psychological significance of  our intellect, consciousness and autonomy. In 
AlphaWolf, the hardened cultural script denying our animality is minimized 
and we can recognize aspects of  ourselves within the wolves’ social dynamic. 
It is that gap that remains between us and our wolf  that opens a space of  
reflection on our respective identities and the role of  affect therein. Arguably, 
some gap between his own identity and the identity of  his avatar, may exist 
for the player of  Counter-Strike, but this gap, I think, is filled by the powerful 
cultural fantasy of  control and power that makes the game so attractive to 
its players. The Counter-Strike player is unlikely to reflect on how far he falls 
short of  his avatar’s masculinity, though the nearly compulsive play of  many 
players suggests that the gap must be filled again and again for the fantasy to 
be maintained. Half-Life, as we’ve said, establishes a space of  critical distance, 
but the distance produced by the installation makes it unlikely that the viewer 
will identify with the game player and learn something reflexively about their 
shared investment within their respective immersive environments.
I would like to conclude claiming that the openness of  the game provides 
the perfect context for exploring the subject, that can attend to the complexity 
of  its permeability. But the situation turns out to be more complex than 
it initially appears. As its name suggests, AlphaWolf implicitly acknowledges 
animal (and human) aggression and the violence of  social hierarchies, rather 
than sublimating such in the context of  war. Players choose, within the 
options given in the programmed wolf  behavior, how to interact with others 
and have the potential to explore the rich interactions among characters and 
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context. However, during my observation, once players understood the basic 
premise of  the game and identified their avatars, without fail they would 
attempt to show dominance over every other wolf  pup they encountered. 
That is, the players at first opportunity reasserted the paranoid position and 
attempted to make the game little different from games like Counter-Strike. 
 The players attempt to dominate attests, I think, to the cultural 
expectation of  game players and underscores how compelling the paranoid 
position is. It is clear that the game was designed with an understanding of  
the likely initial response of  the players in mind. AlphaWolf offers little to 
players approaching it from the paranoid position. Overly aggressive pups 
cannot build the social bonds they need to interact well in the pack. If  players 
want to play they need to learn to do so otherwise. The players were able in 
the end to play in Winnicott’s rich sense of  the term, but only after being 
coaxed by the game’s designer, who drew players into the game by subverting 
the paranoid position: he hid in the game as a wolf  pup and submitted to all 
new players. Once they were able to assert themselves, the new players gave 
up posturing as “alpha wolves” and begin to explore all the play the game 
made possible, as if  they immediately recognized that there was more to the 
game than the assertion of  their boundaries. Hence, my conclusion is still a 
hopeful one: while there is nothing about new media gaming that ensures 
such an outcome, the right game under the right conditions can quite readily 
encourage the emergence of  an “I” able to play with its permeability. This 
permeable self  takes us beyond the apparent contradiction between Pikul’s 
bounded self  and Geller’s unbounded one, and hence beyond the phobic 
position alienated from others and one of  monstrous arrogance seeking to 
assert the self  above all, and gives us instead a self  that can recognize itself  in 
rich, complex, playful interaction with others and the world. 
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NOTES
1. C.f. Klaus Theweleit’s Male Fantasies for an account of  the armored male   
 body as an expression of  fascism and patriarchy. 
2. Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno in Dialectic of  Enlightenment   
 theorize anti-semitism as the product of  the repression of  mimesis and
 a process of  projection, which is close to the Kleinian account I
 discuss below. “Mimesis imitates the environment, but false projection   
 makes the environment like itself. For mimesis the outside world is a
 model which the inner world must try to conform to: the alien must 
 first become familiar; but false projection confuses the inner and outer
 world and defines the most intimate experiences as hostile. Impulses
 which the subject will not admit as his own even though they are most
 assuredly so, are attributed to the object—the prospective victim” (187).
3. Some of  the examples addressed in this section and the following one
 were initially explored by me in “Subjects after New Media,” Quarterly
 Review of  Film and Video, Volume 23, #1, 2006.
4. Weibel, it must be said, is only interested in work that overturns existing
 relations of  power, but given his model of  creation and reality it is unclear
 on what basis a critique of  power could be made. His investment in a   
 notion of  the creative genius does not allow an exploration of  how the
 artist is not only a maker of  the world, but also already made by the world,
 always already ideological or “penetrated,” not just the “penetrator” of
 material reality.
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